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1. Introduction
Since the seminal paper of D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), many papers investigate R&D strategies of
firms in the organization of either R&D competition or R&D cooperation and the effects of R&D investment on
market performances when R&D spillovers take place. Generally, it is presumed in these papers that such
spillovers are parameters determined exogenously, not endogenously. In other words, firms cannot appropriate
their outcomes created by their own R&D activities, and then the outcomes inevitably leak out to their rivals.
However, Poyago−Theotoky (1999) makes a complete volte−face in the conventional treatment about transfer of
R&D outcomes. Namely, she presumes that R&D transfer or disclosure rates are endogenously chosen by firms,
and considers whether firms voluntarily disclose in the absence of any compensation or withhold the
information that they create in their R&D activities under either R&D competition or R&D cooperation. Her
model is a non−tournament model. In contrast, De Fraja (1993) considers whether firms involving patent races
have incentives to disclose or withhold their R&D knowledge in a tournament model.
In order for firms to be able to strategically use information or knowledge such as patents and know−how
acquired through R&D activities they must be able to appropriate such information or knowledge. Nevertheless,
the possibility of appropriation is not always secured, because there are, more or less, spillovers as to the
outcomes of R&D investment among firms and countries, as pointed out by some papers, e.g., Bernstein and
Nadiri (1989), Bernstein and Yan (1997), and Cow and Helpman (1995). Thus one might have some doubts
about taking R&D disclosure rates as strategic variables. However, when we take account of the fact that
intellectual property rights are strictly protected in developed countries, and patent licensing and cross licensing
are actively made among firms, it seems that the idea that the disclosure rates are internally determined by firms
is not necessarily inappropriate. In the following discussion we need to distinguish voluntary disclosure and
inevitable spillover: namely, spillover is a kind of involuntary disclosure.
Poyago−Theotoky (1999) employs a three−stage game model in which duopolistic firms choose R&D
expenditures in the first stage, R&D disclosure rates in the second stage, and outputs in the final stage. The
originality of her model consists in introducing the R&D disclosure rates as decision variables, different from
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D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien et al. (1988). She derives the following results under the
assumption that products are perfect substitutes. Namely, when the firms operate under R&D competition, they
have no incentives to disclose any information of R&D activities: they never make the information public.
Alternatively, when they cooperatively choose R&D expenditures, their optimal policies are to perfectly
disclose the information. This is because both their profits increase more by sharing the results of R&D
investments. This result gives the reason why firms want to form research joint ventures concerning R&D
investment some answer. Thus R&D cartels are likely to be transformed to research joint ventures.
The results of Poyago−Theotoky (1999) are of great interest. However, since the inverse demand functions
employed in her model are very simple, we reexamine whether her results also hold under more general inverse
demand functions, focusing on whether firms have incentives to disclose all or part of knowledge yielded by R&
D investment. Moreover, we extend the realm of investigation from the Cournot−quantity setting models to
Bertrand−price setting models. The comparisons of market performances among four modes (e.g. Cournot
competition with R&D competition and R&D cooperation, and Bertrand competition with R&D competition
and R&D cooperation) are made. Through the comparisons we can provide implications for R&D policy,
including disclosure policy of R&D information. The relationship between an efficient R&D organization and
the types of competition and product and whether disclosure of information is beneficial to producers and
consumers are elucidated. Our extension is meaningful enough when we take account of the fact that in a lot of
industries firms engage in price competition á la Bertrand.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In the next section a basic model of duopoly for analyses
in the following sections is provided. We employ more general inverse demand functions than the Poyago−
Theotoky model. In addition, product differentiation is introduced, e.g. products are either substitutes or
complements for firms according to the type of competition in their markets. In Section 3, in a three−stage game
model of duopoly under Cournot competition we also consider whether or not the firms make a disclosure of
information concerning the results of R&D activities in the organization of either R&D competition or R&D
cooperation. In Section 4 we present a three−stage game model of duopoly under Bertrand competition, and
consider whether there are incentives for firms in the presence of either R&D competition or R&D cooperation
to disclose the information. In Section 5 we make comparisons of market performances such as R&D
investments, prices and profits in the Cournot−quantity setting and Bertrand−price setting models. The final
section concludes the paper.
2. The Model
We consider three−stage games of duopolists by invoking the Poyago−Theotoky (1999) model. In the first stage
of the games two identical firms simultaneously choose R&D investments to curtail their production costs. In
the second stage each firm decides how much of knowledge or technology acquired by its R&D activities to
disclose to its rival. Like the Poyago−Theotoky model, we assume that the firms use disclosure policy as
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strategic methods, not exogenous ones as in previous papers, e.g., D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and
Kamien et al. (1992). Finally, in the third stage the firms play Cournot−quantity competition or Bernard−price
competition in product markets.
The costs of firm i are originally given by c (qi ) Aqi , A  0, i  12, where qi stands for the output of
firm i . It is possible for the firms to reduce their production costs by making an investment in R&D. Now firm i
must expend byxi2, 0, in reducing the costs by xi . Each of the firms may be able to utilize the outcome
of its rival’s R&D investment in addition to that of its own R&D investment. It has been traditionally supposed
that when a firm invests in R&D, part or all of the outcome created by its investment leaks out to its rivals: that
is, the firm cannot appropriate all of its outcome1. In contrast, Poyago−Theotoky (1999) supposes that it can
perfectly manage or control the outcome created by its R&D investment. Following her model, we suppose that
the firms use their disclosure as strategic variables2 3. They endogenously have the choices of whether to leak out
or withhold innovative R&D information or knowledge to their rivals.
When we take account of both R&D investment and its disclosure, the unit cost functions of firms i and j are
given by ci (xixjj ) A xi j xj and cj (xixji ) A xj i xi , i  j , respectively, where i is the
rate of the knowledge as to R&D that firm i discloses to rival j , and is called the disclosure rate of firm i ,
0i 1. For example, ifi  0, then firm i never discloses the amount of its own knowledge to the rival at
all, while ifi  1, then it voluntarily discloses all the amount. Now xi denotes the personal R&D knowledge
level of firm i . On the other hand, xi j xj is the effective R&D knowledge level or effective R&D for firm i
resulted from innovative activities in the duopoly industry, which is composed of its own R&D level, xi , and its
competitor’s R&D level that spills over to it, j xj . If each firm keeps its own R&D knowledge to the rival
secret, then the rival’s R&D investment and effective R&D coincide. Finally, the output costs of firm i are
given by c (qi ) ci (xixjj) qi .
The two firms produce heterogeneous (differentiated) outputs. Then their inverse demand functions are given
by
p1  a bq1eq2
p2  a eq1bq2, a  0, b  0, b  e, e  0.
To simplify, we assume that the demand functions are symmetric. Parameter e denotes the cross−price effect:
given e  0, products are substitutes for the firms in terms of Cournot (−quantity) competition, while, given
1 There are a lot of the following channels through which R&D innovative information diffuses, e.g. movement of personnel from
one firm to another, professional and academic meetings, informal communication networks among engineers and scientists, and
reverse engineering (Mansfield [1985]).
2 For example, patent licensing and cross−licensing are close to disclosure of R&D information.
It is assumed that the firms truthfully disclose their R&D information or knowledge to their rivals if they do it.
3 In her two−stage game models with demand or cost information she considers the disclosure strategies of Cournot−quantity setting
and Bertrand−price setting firms.
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e  0, they are complements. The value of e 2b 2, in general, expresses an index of product differentiation. In
contrast, in the Poyago−Theotoky model it is assumed that b  e  1: namely, her discussion is limited to the
case in which products are perfect substitutes under Cournot competition. In what follows, it is assumed that
a ci , where ci  ci (xixjj ).
The profit function of the firm is expressed byi   pi (qiqj )ci  qi xi22 , i  j , ij  12 (2)
where pi (qiqj ) a bqi eqj .
3. R&D competition and R&D cooperation in the Cournot−quantity setting model
When the firms engage in Cournot competition in the final stage, we have their output reaction functions from
the first−order conditions for profit maximization:
a c12bq1eq2  0
a c2eq12bq2  0.
The slope of each reaction curve depends on the sign of e . When firm 1 increases its disclosure rate on R&D
knowledge, this causes the reaction curve of its rival to move upwards. Now, solving (3), we have the
equilibrium outputs of the firms in the third stage:
qˆ i  2b (a ci )e (a cj )4b 2e 2 , i  j . (4)
These solutions are obtained, irrespective of whether the firms compete or cooperate in the R&D stage. As
mentioned above, if a firm reveals its own R&D knowledge to the rival, then this is to the latter’s benefit,
because its revelation contributes to a reduction in the latter’s cost. The equilibrium in this stage is locally stable.
In the following section we also consider the voluntary disclosure (spillover) strategies of the firms in two
cases of R&D competition and R&D coordination.
3.1 R&D competition
The firms non−cooperatively choose their R&D investments so as to maximize their own profits, competing in
the production stage as well. Particularly, before going forward, we rewrite (2) by using (4) as follows:i  b 2b (a ci )e (a cj )  2
4b 2e 2( )2 xi22  bqi2xi22 , i  j . (2)'
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First we consider the firms’ disclosure strategies in the second stage. Their strategies are to choose the
optimal ones maximizing their own profits. As the first−order and second−order conditions for maximization i i  0 and  2i i2 0 are both satisfied whenever there are interior solutions4. However, in
differentiating (2)’ with respect toi , instead of them we have the following results: i i  4b 2exi qi4b 2e 2 () 0 as e () 0 2i i2 0.
These inequalities demonstrate that the solutions are corner ones, as shown by Poyago−Theotoky (1999): that
is, the optimal choice of i is reduced to either ˆi  0 or 1 and depends on whether products are substitutes
(e 0) or complements (e 0)5. Thus, if they are substitutes, then the choice of firm i is ˆi  0, because even
if it discloses a little information created by its R&D activities, this gives firm j a cost advantage over firm i ,
which, in turn, decreases the latter’s profits. Therefore, each firm withholds the R&D information. This result
has been already derived by her. Meanwhile, if they are complements, then its choice is ˆi  1. This implies
that the firm voluntarily discloses all of its knowledge on R&D to the rival. This is well explained by using the
output reaction curves. In Figure 1, given no disclosure, the two reaction curves, R1
0(q2) and R2
0(q1), with
4 We assume throughout the paper that there are subgame−perfect Nash equilibria in the games.
5 Darrough (1993) demonstrates that the disclosure policies of firms depend on the type, e.g. Cournot or Bertrand, of competition
they are engaged in and the type of private information, e.g. demand or cost, although she considers whether the firms have
incentives to disclose their private information.
Figure 1 Disclosure and Output Reaction Curves
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upward slopes are illustrated. Intersection E C 0 of the curves is the (Cournot−Nash) equilibrium in the
production stage, and 2C 0 denotes the isoprofit curve of firm 2 at the equilibrium. From now on we call the case
of R&D competition under Cournot competition case C. When firm 2 increases the amount of its disclosure, the
reaction curve of firm 1 is shifted to the lower right, R1
1(q2), and then the equilibrium is changed to E C 1, and,
simultaneously, the isoprofit curve moves to 2C 1. Consequently, it follows that the profits of firm 2 increase, i.e. 2C 1 2C 0. This is because the products are complements. Thus it is profitable for each of them to provide its
own R&D information to the rival. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between disclosure rates and the value of
e .
In the case of e 0, although the result that the firms set their disclosure rates to unity shows that they form a
research joint venture (RJV), they do not coordinate their R&D expenditures. This corresponds to RJV
competition in terms of the taxonomy of Kamien et al. (1992). RJV competition means that firms form RJVs,
but do not coordinate their R&D expenditures. Our result provides a theoretical basis for the existence of RJV
competition supposed in Kamien et al. But no theoretical basis for its existence will be provided if the effects are
positive.
We proceed to the R&D stage of the game. When setting ˆ ˆ1  ˆ2 and differentiating (2)’ with respect to
xi , we get the first−order and second−order conditions for maximization6: ixi  2b (2b eˆ)4b 2e 2( )2 2b (a ci )e (a cj )  xi  0 (6)2 ixi2  2b (2b eˆ)24b 2e 2( )2 0，i  j． (7)
6 As the Poyago−Theotoky model, given b  e  1, the second−order conditions are satisfied when89 for e 0 and29
for e 0.
Figure 2 Relationship between Disclosure Rates and the Value of Cross−Price Effects
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The slopes of the reaction curves in R&D space rely on the sign of e : that is, given e  () 0, the curves are
sloping downwards (upwards). Put it differently, x1 and x2 become strategic substitutes or strategic
complements according as its sign is positive or negative. When we return to the choice of whether the firms
disclose or withhold R&D information, it seems that their choices are closely related with the slopes of the R&D
reaction curves rather than those of the output reaction curves.
Substituting (6) into (1)’, we obtain the equilibrium profits of the firm:ˆC   x 2
4b 2b eˆ  2 4b 2e 2  22b 2b eˆ  2 
When we substitute either ˆ 0 or 1 into (4) and solve it, the R&D investments under the symmetric
equilibrium are derived, depending on the sign of e , as follows:
xˆ
C  xˆ 1C  xˆ 2C   4b 2(a A )(2b e )(4b 2e 2)4b 2 for e  0
xˆ
C  xˆ 1C  xˆ 2C   2b (a A )(2b e )24b for e 0.
Note that R&D expenditure is less under e  0 than under e 0. R&D expenditure (effective R&D) increases
in the case of e 0 although the firms perfectly disclose their R&D results. Thus the disclosure of innovative
information has some incentives to conduct R&D. Result 5 summarized by De Bondt (1996) is not always the
case.
We examine the stability of the equilibrium in R&D space. The conditions for it to be locally stable are2ixi2  2jxj2 	
 2ixjxi  2jxixj  0，i  j
where 2i	xjxi  2j	xixj  2b (2b eˆ)(2b ˆe )	4b 2e 2  2 7. When we follow the Poyago−
Theotoky model and set b  e  1, the following conditions for stability must be satisfied: namely,
04	9 or 4	38. It is intuitively reasonable that the equilibrium is stable when a rate of increase in the
7 The stability conditions are given as follows:
8b 3(4b 2e 2)24b 2e 0 for e  0
4b (2b e )2 0 for e 0.
For example, if there is perfect complementarity between products, i.e. b  1 and e  1, then the stability condition is reduced
to 4. Incidentally, in this case the second−order conditions are 2.
8 Henriques (1990) describes the relationship between the stability of the equilibrium in R&D space and R&D spillovers under the
D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1989) model. When these spillovers are given exogenously, she demonstrates that its stability in R&
D space depends crucially on the magnitudes of spillovers: specifically, if they are small, then the equilibrium is unstable.
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marginal costs of R&D investment is great9. But it is counter−intuitive that the equilibrium is also stable even if
that rate is small. Taking account of the second−order conditions, we note that condition 4 3must hold for
the existence and stability of the equilibrium. Different from Henriques (1990), there is no evidence that the
existence of spillovers (i.e. concealment or disclosure) especially makes equilibria in R&D space unstable.
When we use the equilibrium R&D investments, the amounts of outputs in both cases of e 0 and e 0 are
obtained, respectively, as
qˆ
C  qˆ 1C  qˆ 2C   2(a A )(4b 2e 2)(2b e )(4b 2e 2)4b 2 for e 0
qˆ
C  qˆ 1C  qˆ 2C  2(a A )(2b e )(2b e )24b for e 0.
From the comparison of both outputs we find that output under e 0 is less than or equal to output under
e 0, where the equality holds only at b  e . Thus it follows that price under e 0 is higher than or equal to
price under e 0.
Examine the effect of product differentiation on R&D. Then we obtain that, with e 0, d xˆ 0C de 0 for
0e 2b 3, and d xˆ 0C de 0 for 2b 3e b . Given 2b 3e b , if product−market competition is
less intense, then this makes the firms decrease their R&D expenditures, but given 0e 2b 3, it conversely
makes them increase their R&D expenditures. In other words, whereas the advance of product differentiation
increases R&D expenditure if the degree of product differentiation e 2 b 2 is less than 4 / 9, its advance decreases
R&D expenditure if it is larger than 4 / 9. It appears that this threshold deeply relates to the number of firms in
the industry and rises as the number increases. In general, it is recognized that it leads to a decrease in strategic
R&D expenditure since a rise in product differentiation lightens competition among firms. This recognition,
however, is not the case in the presence of R&D commitment. The outcome that the advance of product
differentiation functions so as to reduce output through its commitment is of interest in comparison with the
result without it that the advance always causes output to increase. On the other hand, provided there exists
strategic investment, as the indirect effect its advance causes the amount of R&D investment to increase for
region 4 9e 2 b 2 1. Therefore, the advance might lead to the opposite of the result derived in the case
without strategic investment.
Let us turn to the case in which there is a complementary relationship between products, i.e. e 0. An
advance in such a relationship leads to an increase in R&D expenditure, i.e. d xˆ 1
C de 0: that is, a firm
increases its expenditure as product−market complementarity strengthens. Alternatively, we consider the effect
of e on output which is divided into two effects, i.e. a direct and an indirect effects, q e and
(q x )(x e ), respectively. In the case of e 0 we have d qˆ C de 0 for 0e 2b 3, but the effect is
9 Nowis the second derivative of the R&D expenditure function,xi2 2, which measures the curvature of the function.
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ambiguous for 2b 3e  b because both direct and indirect effects move in opposite directions, while we
have d qˆ
C de 0 for e 0. Except for the case of 2b 3e  b , the more complementary products are, the
larger the amount of output becomes.
3.2 R&D cooperation
Now the firms form a cartel in the R&D stage and coordinate their R&D expenditures, maintaining quantity
competition in the production stage. We consider the choices of disclosure in the second stage and R&D
investments under the R&D cartel in the first stage: that is, they choose them so as to maximize joint profits 12.
First, we investigate whether they intend to withhold or disclose their outcomes obtained by R&D
investments each other. In order for disclosure rates to have interior solutions, conditions   i 0 and2  i2 0 must be satisfied. However, when differentiating the joint profits with respect to the disclosure
rates, we have i ii ji  2bxi4b 2d 2( )2 (eqi 2bqj )02 i2 2b qii  22b qji  2 0，i j .
The conditions for the interior solutions are not satisfied, so that there exist corner solutions. Thus the optimal
choices are reduced to either ˆ0 or 1. Since there is a symmetric equilibrium in the second stage, the profits
at ˆ1 obviously exceeds those at ˆ0. It follows that the firms choose to disclose the R&D information,ˆ1, but their choices are suboptimal. Hence the firms voluntarily disclose all information concerning R&D,
irrespective of whether products are substitutes or complements for them. This implies that making all their
research results public yields more joint profits for them rather than concealing their results. Therefore, the
result of Poyato−Theotoky (1999) also holds for more general inverse demand functions. Furthermore, her result
carries over to the case in which products are complements. It seems that our result also provides some
theoretical basis for the fact that if firms cooperate on their R&D investment decisions, then RJV cartelization in
terms of Kamien et al. (1992) is created, regardless of the type of product, e.g. substitutes or complements, as
she mentions. In other words, if firms form cartels in terms of R&D investment, this has the mechanisms to
create RJVs among them voluntarily. In addition, the disclosure of R&D information will eliminate wasteful
duplication.
Second, the first−order conditions for maximization of the joint profits in the R&D stage are xi ixi jxi 2b (2b eˆ)4b 2e 2( )2 2b (a ci )e (a cj ) xi 
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2b (2b  ˆ e )
4b 2 e 2( )2 2b (a  cj ) e (a  ci )  0，i j .
The second−order conditions are given by2 xi2  4b2b e( )2 0,
where  ˆ1. When we substitute (9) into the profit function of each firm, the equilibrium profits under
symmetry are obtained:ˆCC x 2
16b
2b e( )2 8b 
where  ˆ1. In the following we call the case of R&D cooperation under Cournot competition case CC.
Since the subgame−perfect Nash equilibrium is symmetric, by solving (9) the amount of R&D investment of
each firm is given10:
xˆ
CC xˆ 1CC xˆ 2CC  4b (a  A )2b e( )2 8b 
These are the solutions under the R&D cartel. R&D investment is greater under R&D competition than under R
&D cooperation, i.e. xˆ
CC xˆ C , for any e 11. This is the same as the result of Poyago−Theotoky (1999).
We have assumed that the firms collude in determining their R&D investments. When D’Aspremont and
Jacquemin (1988), Kamien et al. (1992), and Poyago−Theotoky (1999) consider the R&D investment and
disclosure strategies of firms under R&D cartels, they implicitly assume that the equilibrium solutions under the
cartels are internally stable. Output cartels are, however, faced with the risk of its collapsing from the inside, as
well known. Therefore, we should pay attention to the problem of internal stability of the cartel. Consider what
happens when firm i contemplates increasing its R&D investment by some amount, but firm j maintaining the
cartel agreement level of its R&D investment. Then, evaluating (9) at the cartel level and using  ˆ1, we
obtainixi  jxi  2b (2b  ˆ e )4b 2 e 2( )2 2b (a  cj ) e (a  ci )  0，i j .
This demonstrates that even if firm i is sure that the rival will stick to the cartel R&D investment on which they
were agreed, it would not be beneficial for firm i to increase R&D investment secretly: namely, each firm has
10 Now the second−order conditions are assumed to be satisfied.
11 Conventionally, as mentioned by De Bondt (1996), cooperative R&D also exceeds non−cooperative R&D if spillover rates are
relatively large (see, e.g., D’Aspremont and Jacquemin [1988]).
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an incentive to repeal the cartel agreement. Thus the R&D cartels will be internally stable, but output cartels are
not. It is meaningful to consider the choices of disclosure rates whenever the cartels possess internal stability.
Let us examine the effect of e on R&D expenditure. Now since d xˆ
CC de 0, the amount of xˆ CC increases
as e decreases: namely, a firm increases its R&D expenditure when product differentiation advances or the
complementary relationship between products strengthens. In particular, when they are perfect substitutes,
cooperative R&D expenditure is reduced to the minimum.
Substituting the equilibrium R&D investment into (4), we obtain the equilibrium output
qˆ
CC  2(a A )(2b e )2b e( )28b 
Since d qˆ
CC de 0, the more intense product−market competition is, the more the output of each firm
increases. This result is different from that under R&D competition.
Comparing the amounts of both outputs under R&D competition and R&D cooperation by using (4), we
obtain that qˆ
CC qˆ C for any e , regardless of whether or not the firms disclose their own R&D knowledge. This
is owing to result xˆ
CCxˆ C . As a result, prices are higher under R&D competition than under R&D cooperation,
so that consumer’s surplus is larger under R&D cooperation than under R&D competition, i.e. pˆ
CC pˆ C , for
any e , as shown in Poyago−Theotoky (1999)12. Let us turn to producer’s surplus denoted by (2) or (2)’. When
the cross−price effects are positive, e 0, we cannot compare between ˆCC and ˆC , although she derives the
result that producer’s surplus is greater under R&D cooperation than under R&D competition in the case in
which products are perfect substitutes. This implies that her result does not necessarily hold in more general
models. Incidentally, the condition for ˆCC () ˆC is() 6b 3 (2b e )2 (2b e )(b e )b 2  , and,
in particular, in the case of b  e it is reduced to8 9b 13. If the marginal costs of R&D investment rapidly
(slowly) increase, then it follows that profits in the presence of R&D cooperation exceed (fall short of) profits in
the absence of it. Like this, cost parameter of R&D investment plays an important role in determining the
ranking of both profits. We conclude that the result of Poyago−Theotoky is, generally, not relevant. More
important, profits in the absence of R&D cartelization may exceed those in the presence of it although firms
never share their R&D information in the former case.
Alternatively, when the cross−price effects are negative, and if firms form a cartel on R&D, producer’s
surplus increases in comparison with the case of R&D competition, i.e. ˆCC ˆC . This is caused by two
effects: first, the firms can share R&D information and reduce their R&D costs each other as a result of R&D
cooperation, and then their outputs increase; and second, increases in the outputs enhance the demands for
12 Katz (1985) describes that cooperate research is likely to raise consumer’s surplus. Kamien et al. (1992) also obtain that price is
lower in the presence of R&D cooperation than in the absence of it if spillovers are relatively large.
138 9b is the second−order conditions for maximization in the first stage under R&D competition. Incidentally,6b 3 (2b e )2 (2b e )(b e )b 2  is apparently different from our second−order conditions. Kamien et al. (1992) derive
the result that R&D cooperation (cartel) leads to higher profits, compared with the profits without it. In fact, in the Poyago−
Theotoky model it is assumed that b  e  1, and, moreover,8 9 is satisfied.
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(11)
them, because they are complements. Consequently, R&D cooperation increases more welfare than R&D
competition as long as they are complements. In this case the effect of R&D cooperation is to lower prices and
to raise both consumer’s and producer’s surpluses. Thus to form R&D cartels is of benefit to both consumers
and producers.
4. R&D competition and R&D cooperation in the Bertrand−price setting model
We consider the output and R&D investment behavior of firms in Bertrand’s model of price−setting duopoly. In
the production stage the firms set their prices so as to maximize their own profits, but in the first and second
stages they behave in the same way as in the previous section.
By solving inverse demand functions (1), the corresponding demand functions are derived as follows:
q1   p1p2
q2   p1p2,
where   a(b e ),  b(b 2e 2), and  e(b 2e 2) 14. The signs of both e and are the same: that
is,is positive or negative according as the cross−price effects are positive or negative.
We can express the profits of firm i asi  (pi ci )qi (pipj )xi22 ，i  j , (10)
where qi (pipj )  pi pj . This profit function is the counterpart of (2). The firms set prices so as to
maximize their own profits in the third stage, given R&D investments and the rates of R&D disclosure chosen in
the previous stages, respectively. From the first−order conditions for maximization we have price reaction
functions as15 c12p1p2  0 c2p12p2  0.
The slopes of these reaction curves depend on the sign of : that is, given (	) 0, the reaction curves are
sloping upwards (downwards). Thus products are complements for the firms if0, while they are substitutes
if	0.
From (11) the equilibrium prices for both outputs are derived as
14 In this section it is assumed that b  e .
15 In this stage the second−order conditions are satisfied, and the equilibirum is locally stable.
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(13)
pˆ i   (2)(2ci cj )422 , i  j . (12)
4.1 R&D competition
Using (12) and making a tedious calculation, we can rewrite (10) as follows:i   (2)(222)ci cj )  2
(422)2 xi22  qi2xi22 , i  j . (10)’
In the second stage each of the firms chooses its R&D disclosure rate so as to maximize its own profits. Then
the first−order and second−order conditions for maximization must be ii  0 and 2ii2 	0 in order
for optimal R&D disclosure rate ˆi to have an interior solution. However, instead of both conditions we obtainii  2xi qi422 
(	) 0 as 	(
) 02ii2   232xi2422 2 
0,
where qi   (2)(222)ci cj (422). These inequalities demonstrate that the equilibrium
in the second stage holds at the corner. Concretely, if 
0, then optimal disclosure rate for firm i is eitherˆi  0 or 1 asii 	0, while if	0, then it is ˆi  1 asii 
0. In the former case let us compare
profit levels at ˆi  0 and 1. The profits are less at ˆi  1 than at ˆi  0 when we take into consideration the
fact that the equilibrium is symmetric. In effect, the optimal behavior as to R&D disclosure is to appropriate
(disclose) their information of R&D investment as long as products are complements (substitutes). These results
are explained as follows. First, if they are complements (
0), then a rise in i causes the upward sloping
price reaction curve of firm j to move downwards in that the profits of firm i decrease. Second, if they are
substitutes (	0), then its rise causes the downward sloping reaction curve of firm j to move downwards. Put
is differently, if firm 1 provides more its own information on R&D to its rival than ever, then this leads to a
decrease in the price of product 2, i.e. an increase in its output, and, simultaneously, to an increase in the price of
product 1 in that firm 1’s profits increase. This is illustrated in Figure 3, where Ψ i (pj )i  j , denotes the price
reaction curve of firm iIf firm 1 raises the rate of disclosure, then its reaction curve is kept unchanged, but the
reaction curve of the rival is shifted from Ψ 20(p1) to Ψ 21(p1), so that the Bertrand equilibrium moves from E B 0
to E B 1. Both1B 0 and1B 1 are the isoprofit curves of firm 1. Superscript B denotes the case of R&D competition
under Bertrand competition, and superscript 0 (1) variables before (after) its rate changes. It seems that an
increase in its profits is due to a rise in its price. From these two cases we note that the firms should choose
different strategies about R&D disclosure by a difference in the type of product.
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The optimal choices as to R&D disclosure rates are finally determined only by the sign of the cross−price
effects (e ), and are independent of whether the firms compete with each other in quantity or price. Namely,
given e  0, they will have the incentives to fully appropriate their knowledge newly acquired by R&D
activities, while given e  0, they will have those to share all of their R&D knowledge each other. The result in
the latter case shows that the selfish decisions of firms lead to the formation of RJVs in R&D, so that RJV
competition in terms of Kamien et al. (1992) takes place under Bertrand competition as well as under Cournot
competition.
We proceed to the decisions of R&D investment. When we differentiate profit function (10) with respect to
xi , the first−order and second−order conditions are given asixi   2422  2 (2)(222)ci cj (222)ˆ xi  02ixi2   2(422) (222)ˆ 2	0，i  j

where ˆstands for the optimal R&D disclosure rate, because the firms are symmetric. The slopes of the reaction
curves in R&D space derived from (6)’ reply on the sign of , i.e., as a consequence, e : that is, given (	) 0, both curves are sloping downwards (upwards)16. This shows that whether x1 and x2 are strategic
substitutes or strategic complements also relies on the sign of e , not the type of competition in the third stage.
We may conclude that whether the firms disclose or withhold their R&D information is closely related with the
16 We assume that the equilibrium in R&D space is locally stable.
Figure 3 Disclosure and Price Reaction Curves
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slopes of the R&D reaction curves, because the same indication is made in Section 3.1 as well.
Using first−order conditions (6)’ and arranging them, we can derive the equilibrium profits of the firm17: ˆB   x 2
4(222)ˆ  2 (422)22(222)ˆ  2 
Under symmetry the R&D investments are derived from (6)’:
xˆ
B  xˆ 1B  xˆ 2B   2(222) A ()  (2) (2)22()(222) for0
xˆ
B  xˆ 1B  xˆ 2B  2() A ()  (2)24()2 for	0.
Different from the result in the Cournot−quantity setting model, it is indeterminate whether disclosure of
innovative information has an incentive to conduct R&D investment. It is, furthermore, difficult to determine the
effect ofon R&D expenditures, differently from the case of Cournot competition.
The equilibrium prices are given by
pˆ
B  pˆ 1B  pˆ 2B  (A)(2) (2)22(1)(222)(2) (2)22()(222) for0
pˆ
B  pˆ 1B  pˆ 2B  (2)(A)4()(2)24()2 for	0.
Since the effect on the prices of a change in also remains indeterminate, we cannot specify the effects of
changes in product differentiation on R&D investments and prices.
4.2 R&D cooperation
The firms now determine both their R&D expenditures in the first stage and their disclosure rates in the second
stage so as to maximize their joint profits,    1 2, determining their prices in the final stage. This
subsection is the counterpart of Subsection 3.2. In order for the second stage equilibrium to have interior
solutions, both 
 
i  0 and 
2 
i2 	0 must be satisfied. However, instead of these conditions we get
the following results:
17 The conditions for the equilibrium in R&D space to be stable are
2 i
xi2  
2 j
xj2 	
 
2 i
xj
xi  
2 j
xi
xj 0，i  j
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   i   i i  j i  2(222)xj xi  (422)2 H     0 for() 0 (14) 2  i2   2i i2  2j i2 0，i  j
where H   	(2)(222)ci cj )  . In the case of0 there apparently exist corner solutions such
as ˆ 1, because the model is symmetric. In the case of 0,   
 i 0 is derived, so that iˆ  1 18. Thus
the joint profits are an increasing function of the R&D disclosure rates in any case, so the (sub) optimal rates areˆ( iˆ ) 1. As in the previous section, the optimal choice as to disclosure is to share all amount of its
knowledge on R&D activities to the other. In doing so, their joint profits are maximized. Thus, in both cases of
e 0 and e 0, RJV cartelization in terms of the taxonomy of Kamien et al. (1992) is unconsciously yielded.
These results also provide some theoretical basis for the reason why firms form RJVs in the presence of price
competition as well as in the presence of quantity one.
Using the first−order conditions as to R&D investment, we have the equilibrium profits under R&D
cooperation19:ˆBC   x 2
16()2 (2)28()2 
Under the symmetric subgame−perfect Nash equilibrium the amount of R&D investment is given by solving the
first−order conditions:
xˆ
BC  xˆ 1BC  xˆ 2BC  4() 	A ()  (2)28()2
These are the solutions under the R&D cartel. The cartel is also internally stable as in case CC.
When we express xˆ
B
and xˆ
BC
by a , b , and e in place of 	, , and and make a comparison between non−
cooperative R&D and cooperative R&D investments, the following results are derived. If the cross−price effects
are positive, i.e. e 0, then xˆ BC xˆ B holds. The intuition behind this result is straightforward. This is because
18 If the symmetric equilibrium is not assumed, then it is not clear whether the optimal disclosure rate of firm i is unity, i.e. ˆi  1.
19 The first−order conditions for maximization of the joint profits are   xi   i xi  j xi   2(422)2 	(2)(222)ci cj (222)ˆ  xi 2
(422)2 	(2)(222)cj ci ˆ(222)   0，i  j
Furthermore, we assume that the second−order and stability conditions are all satisfied.
３２６ Shoji Haruna
－１６－
a reduction in production costs exceeds that in price when R&D cartels are organized. On the other hand, if the
effects are negative, then xˆ
BC  xˆ B as long as b  e3 11 3 2 ≒0782, and xˆ BC xˆ B as long as
b  e3  11 3 2 ≒0782. The condition of b  e30782 means that the difference between the own
price and cross−price effects is relatively small, in short the price elasticity of demand is large. Therefore, if the
own price effects are not small, then there will be few combinations of (be ) to satisfy inequality
b  e30782. In contrast, there will be a lot of such combinations to satisfy b  e3 0782. Thus R&D
cooperation typically has the effect to diminish R&D investment. If firms can cooperate on R&D, then they
choose to keep their R&D investments at a moderate level rather than increase R&D investments uselessly,
because increases in the investments lower prices and profits. This result is obviously different from the result in
the Cournot−quantity setting model in which products are complements.
By substituting xˆ
BC
into (12), we obtain the equilibrium prices
pˆ
BC pˆ 1BC pˆ 2BC (A) 8( 	)(2 	)2 8( 	)2
We now turn to welfare comparisons. Prices are decreasing functions of R&D investment, as shown in (12).
Hence, if e  0, then we have pˆ B  pˆ BC because xˆ BC is larger than xˆ B . On the other hand, if e 0, then the
following results are obtained by the direct comparison of pˆ
B
and pˆ
BC
, that is, we have pˆ
B pˆ BC as long as
b  e30782 (i.e. the price elasticity of demand is large), so that consumer’s surplus decreases by R&D
cooperation; and in contrast we have pˆ
B  pˆ BC as long as b  e3 0782. Consumer’s surplus increases by
R&D cooperation as long as e  0, and, moreover, e 0 and b  e3 0782 20. We find that cartelization in
R&D activities is typically beneficial to consumers. We also get the following result with respect to producer’s
surplus: 
ˆBC  
ˆB . In particular, as long as products are complements in terms of Bertrand competition and the
price elasticity of demand is small, R&D cooperation, not R&D competition, leads to a rise in welfare. This is
the same as the result obtained in the Cournot−quantity setting model.
5. A Comparison between Cournot and Bertrand competition
We compare and rank R&D investments, prices, and profits among four modes yielded by combining one of
two types of competition, Cournot and Bertrand, and one of two types of R&D organization, competition and
cooperation, e.g. C, CC, B, and BC.
5.1 Comparison of R&D investments
First, we compare both R&D investments, xˆ
C
and xˆ
B
, under R&D competition. Then we have
20 Given e  0, the optimal disclosure rates are zero in the presence of R&D competition. So the cost per unit is A  x . In this case
we obtain that xˆ
B xˆ BC as long as (1 3 )	. Those in the presence of R&D cooperation are unity, so that the cost is A  2x .
When taking account of this result and calculating, we have that xˆ
B xˆ BC .
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(15)
(16)
(17)
xˆ
C  xˆ B for e  0
xˆ
C xˆ B for e 0.
These results show that R&D investment is larger (smaller) in the Cournot−quantity setting model than in the
Bertrand−price setting model if products are substitutes (complements) in terms of Cournot competition, i.e.
e  () 0. See the Appendix for the derivation of (15).
Let us proceed to the comparison of both R&D investments under R&D cooperation. Consequently, we have
xˆ
CC  xˆ BC for e  0
xˆ
CC xˆ BC for e 0.
When the firms coordinate their R&D expenditures, whether xˆ
CC
is larger or smaller than xˆ
BC
depends on the
type of product, as shown above. See the Appendix for the derivation of (16). We find from (15) and (16) that
firms facing Cournot competition invest in more (less) R&D than firms facing Bertrand competition when the
cross−price effects are positive (negative), irrespective of whether the firms cooperate on their R&D decisions.
This is due to the fact that products are reduced to substitutes under Cournot competition or Bertrand
competition when the effects are positive or negative, respectively.
Let us, moreover, compare R&D levels among the four modes. When arranging the results concerning R&D
investment in the previous sections, (15) and (16), we obtain
xˆ
CC  xˆ BC  xˆ B and xˆ CC  xˆ C  xˆ B for e  0.
The largest R&D investment level among the four modes is attained in case CC in which firms engage in
Cournot competition in the third stage and choose their R&D investments cooperatively in the first stage. In
contrast, given e 0, we obtain
xˆ
B  xˆ BC  xˆ CC  xˆ C for b  e3 0782
xˆ
BC  xˆ CC  xˆ C or xˆ BC  xˆ B  xˆ C for b  e30782.
The largest R&D level may be attained in case B in which firms engage in Bertrand competition in the third
stage and choose their R&D investments non−cooperatively in the first stage21. What is of interest is that the
ranking of xˆ
B
and xˆ
BC
is changed by the magnitude of b  e3. Although these results are derived under the
assumption that the inverse demand functions are symmetric, the same results will also hold even if this
21 Strictly speaking, if b  e30782, then the R&D investment level is the largest among the four cases when Bertrand−price
setting firms form cartels on R&D. However, this case seldom takes place.
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assumption is loosened.
5.2 Comparison of prices
Each of output prices p C and p B under both Cournot and Bertrand competition is a decreasing function of R&D
investment. In order to compare these prices in the presence of R&D competition we use the price functions
such as p C  p C (x ) and p B  p B (x ), where p C (x )  ab A (b e )(1 ˆ)x  (2b e ) and p B (x ) 
a (b e )Ab (1 ˆ)x  (2b e ). As illustrated in Figure 4, price curve p C (x ) under Cournot
competition is always above p B (x ) under Bertrand competition for any R&D investment, that is p C (x )p B (x )
for any x .
First, we make a comparison between Cournot and Bertrand prices under R&D competition. Taking the result
of (15) into consideration and the relationship between the two prices, we have
pˆ
C   pˆ B for e 0
pˆ
C pˆ B for e 0.
For example, the second result is illustrated in Figure 4. As for output we straightforwardly obtain that qˆ
C   qˆ B
for e 0 and qˆ C qˆ B for e 0. If the cross−price effects are negative, then competition is fiercer in the
Bertrand−price setting model than in the Cournot−quantity setting model, so that the price is lower in the
former. In contrast, when the effects are positive, output under Cournot competition might exceed output under
Bertrand competition. As well known, if there is no strategic R&D investment, prices are higher under Cournot
competition than under Bertrand competition. The conventional result is the same as that in the case of e 0,
but apparently different from that in the case of e 0. This difference will be due to the fact that the existence
of strategic R&D investment leads to more increased output under Cournot competition than under Bertrand
competition as long as e 0. Incidentally, consumer’s surplus is obviously larger in the Cournot−quantity
Figure 4 Cournot Price and Bertand Price Curves
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(18)
setting model than in the Bertrand−price setting model whenever the cross−price effects are negative.
We find from (15) and (16) that the same results as under R&D competition hold under R&D cooperation as
well: that is, pˆ
CC   pˆ BC for e  0, and pˆ CC  pˆ BC for e  0. Furthermore, putting results (17) and the
relationship between p C and p B together, the following results are derived:
if e 0,
pˆ
B pˆ BC pˆ CC pˆ C for b e3 0782
pˆ
BC pˆ CC pˆ C or pˆ BC pˆ B pˆ C for b e30782.
As long as the cross−price effects are negative, and, moreover, the price elasticity of demand is relatively small,
namely b e3 0782 holds, then the price in the absence of R&D cooperation under Bertrand competition
is the lowest among the four modes, and the price in the absence of R&D cooperation under Cournot
competition is the highest. Thus consumer’s surplus is maximized in case B and is minimized in case C. The
results above show that R&D cartelization leads to a rise in price under Bertrand competition and, conversely, to
a reduction in it under Cournot competition. In the case of b e30782, which is the less common case in
comparison with the other case, the price in the presence of R&D cooperation under Bertrand competition is the
lowest among the four modes. Thus consumer’s surplus is maximized in case BC. The ranking of pˆ
B
and pˆ
BC
is
reversed according to whether the magnitude of (b e3) is less or greater than 0.782. This change is
intuitively explained as follows. For example, when the price elasticity of demand gets relatively small, firms
have incentives to increase their outputs, so that prices lower. R&D cartelization leads to a reduction in price
under Bertrand competition as well as under Cournot competition. When the cross−price effects are positive,
there does not exist the perfect correspondence between R&D levels and prices, as shown above.
5.3 Comparison of profits
From the comparison of profits we haveˆCC  ˆBC for e  0ˆCC ˆBC for e 0.
See the Appendix about the derivation of these results. Whether profits under R&D cooperation are greater in
the Cournot−quantity setting model than in the Bertrand−price setting model depends only on the sign of e as in
the comparison of the R&D investments: that is, producer’s surplus in the former model thus exceeds (falls
short of) that in the latter model whenever products are substitutes (complements). In contrast, it is impossible to
make a comparison between profits under Cournot and Bertrand competition in the presence of R&D
competition, i.e. ˆC   ˆB .
Now, taking account of the previous results concerning price, we obtain the following result: namely, welfare
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is higher under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition whenever the cross−price effects are
negative and firms cooperatively choose their R&D. Moreover, both consumer’s and producer’s surpluses are
increased by the formation of R&D cartels, and this result does not rely on whether firms engage in Cournot or
Bertrand competition in product markets.
We turn to profit comparisons among the four modes. Putting the previous results together, we obtain the
following results:
if e  0,ˆCC  ˆBC  ˆB and ˆCC  ˆC for 6b 2(2b  e )2 (2b e )(b e ) b 2  ˆC  ˆCC  ˆBC  ˆB for6b 2(2b  e )2 (2b e )(b e ) b 2  ;
and
if e 0,ˆBC  ˆCC  ˆC and ˆBC  ˆB .
As mentioned above, when the cross−price effects are positive, the highest profits are attained in the presence of
R&D cooperation (competition) under Cournot competition if the curvature,, of the R&D expenditure function
is comparatively large (small), that is, if the marginal costs of R&D investment increase rapidly (slowly). Then
producer’s surplus is maximized in the presence of R&D cooperation under Cournot competition as long as its
marginal costs rapidly increase, and maximized in the presence of R&D competition under Cournot competition
as long as the marginal costs slowly increase. On the other hand, when the effects are negative, the highest
profits are attained in the presence of R&D cooperation under Bertrand competition, and then producer’s surplus
is maximized. On the whole, if firms form an R&D cartel, then this tends to give more profits to them in
comparison with the case without it. From the outcomes as to consumer’s surplus and producer’s surplus we
find that welfare in the presence of R&D cooperation under Bertrand competition is the highest among the four
modes as long as both the cross−price effects are negative and the price elasticity of demand is great, i.e.
b e30782.
6. Summary
We have extended the Poyago−Theotoky (1999) model of three−stage games in two directions: one is to employ
more general inverse demand functions more than her model; and the other is to consider the behavior of firms
in Bertrand’s model of price−setting oligopoly as well as in Cournot’s model of quantity−setting oligopoly.
These extensions are related only with the final stage of the three−stage game models, and the other two stages
are the same as her model. We have derived several results. First, both optimal disclosure strategies of quantity−
setting and price−setting firms are the same in the presence of R&D competition, and their strategies are
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dependent on whether R&D investments are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. For example, the
firms withhold (disclose) their information about R&D activities if they are strategic substitutes (complements).
We thus find that what determines the disclosure strategies of firms is ultimately dependent on the cross−price
effects in inverse demand functions in both Cournot−quantity setting and Bertrand−price setting models.
Namely, their strategies deeply relate to the slopes of the R&D reaction curves, not those of the output reaction
curves.
Second, when cooperating in investing in R&D, they will make their R&D outcomes public not only under
Cournot competition but also under Bertrand competition. It is concluded that the disclosure strategy of the firm
in the presence of R&D cooperation and R&D competition depends only on the cross−price effects in inverse
demand functions. It is of great interest that both R&D cooperation in the R&D stage and a difference in the
type of market competition between firms never influence on their strategies. Firms have the incentives to share
their R&D information each other even if products are substitutes under Bertrand competition.
R&D cooperation always leads to RJVs in R&D, i.e. RJV cartelization in terms of Kamien et al. (1992).
Moreover, if the cross−price effects are negative, then RJVs are also formed in the presence of R&D
competition, irrespective of whether firms engage in Cournot or Bertrand competition. More interestingly, this is
obtained even if each of them chooses its R&D expenditure so as to selfishly maximize its own profits. Then
this shows that it is not always necessary for governments to support the establishment of RJVs in R&D.
Poyago−Theotoky (1999) makes a comparison between R&D investments, prices and profits in both R&D
competition and R&D cooperation under Cournot competition. Her results concerning R&D investment and
price hold in more general inverse demand functions as well, however her result concerning profit is invalid.
Our results can be, moreover, extended as follows. Even if firms with the intention of disclosing R&D
information make a claim for a reward for their disclosure, our results also hold if the level of the reward is not
great.
We have compared market performances among the four modes. Generally, prices are lower under Bertrand
competition than under Cournot competition when the cross−price effects are negative. Alternatively, if the
price elasticity of demand is small, then the price in the presence of R&D competition under Bertrand
competition is the lowest among the four modes, while if the elasticity is great, then the price in the presence of
R&D cooperation under Bertrand competition is the lowest. This result has some policy implications. For
example, in order to raise consumer’s surplus the government needs to take policies to deter or promote R&D
cartelization according as the elasticity is small or large. This shows that it is not optimal to prohibit firms from
forming R&D cartels from the viewpoint of that surplus. When the cross−price effects are positive, prices might
be lower under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition. It is, however, ambiguous whether
disclosure of R&D information has advantageous effects on consumers. Consequently, it appears that the effects
of disclosure on prices are not typically so great.
When the cross−price effects are positive, the profits in the presence (absence) of R&D cartelization under
quantity competition are the largest among the four modes if the marginal costs of R&D investment increase
３３２ Shoji Haruna
－２２－
rapidly (slowly). In contrast, when these effects are negative, the largest profits are attained in the presence of R
&D cartelization under price competition. Thus the level of producer’s surplus totally depends on both the signs
of the cross−price effects and rates of increase in the investment costs. These reveal that it is not always
profitable for firms to form R&D cartels in the R&D stage. Moreover, the effect of disclosure on firms’ profits
does not seem to be great. The form of the R&D expenditure function may have important effects on firms’
profits rather than disclosure of information.
When the effects are negative and, moreover, the price elasticity of demand is large, welfare under Bertrand
competition is raised up to the highest level among the four modes by R&D cartelization. But, on the whole, the
formation of them tends to yield larger profits to producers than consumers.
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Appendix
The derivation of (15):
To compare R&D investments we first change parameters, ,,, in xˆ B into a , b , and c . After calculation it is obtained that
xˆ
C  xˆ B   (4b 2e 2)e 3(4b 2e 2)(2b e )4b 2  (4b 2e 2)(2b e )(b e )2b (2b 2e 2)   for e 0
and
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xˆ
C  xˆ B   2 e 3 (2b e )24b   (2b e )2 (b e )24b (b 2e 2)   for e 0.
The derivation of (16):
Similarly, we obtain a difference between xˆ
CC
and xˆ
BC
:
xˆ
CC xˆ BC   8b e 3(a A ) (2b e )28b   (2b e )2 (b e )28b (b 2e 2)  
The derivation of (18):
Profits ˆBC are rewritten asˆBC   b (a A )2 (b e ) (2b e )2 (b e )8b (b e )
Then we get a difference between ˆCC and ˆBC :ˆCC ˆBC   2b e 3 (a A )2 (2b e )28b   (2b e )2 (b e )8b (b e )  
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Disclosure Policy, and Competition and
Cartelization in R&D: Cournot and Bertrand
Competition
Shoji Haruna
This paper considers whether firms have incentives to disclose their R&D information to their rivals in
Cournot−quantity setting and Bertrand−price setting models. Furthermore, we compare market performances, e.
g. R&D investments, prices and profits, in these models. It is shown that whether they have such incentives
depends only on the signs of cross−price effects in demand functions, irrespective of the type of competition, e.
g. Cournot or Bertrand competition. When making comparisons of them among four modes, we find that the
formation of R&D cartels tends to increase the expenditure of R&D investment and then gains more profits.
Alternatively, we point out that quantity−setting firms gain more profits in the presence of R&D cooperation
than in the absence of it when products are substitutes in terms of Cournot competition.
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